Burma/Myanmar: A country blessed by Gods and cursed for Men, by Guy LUBEIGT* senior research fellow at the CNRS

 

A few years ago, after having visited Burma, an eminent member of our Réseau Asie commented: “Religion is the opium of the people, but Burmese Buddhism is the pipe to smoke it”. Surprising it may seem, this statement cracked like a joke, is not totally groundless. The respect for basic precepts of the Buddhist philosophy (Dâna: donation; Sîla: virtues; Bhâvanâ: meditation) conditions the life of 70 % of Burmese who claim to have their roots in Buddhism. Their daily life is marked by the practice of virtues like modesty, austerity, frugality, as well as by the sentiment of living in a calm world without being excessive, well protected by the pagodas and monasteries that line the countryside.

 

A few days after the conclusion of the works of the National Convention convened by the junta to draw up a constitution intended to legitimate and perpetuate its power, some theories of monks (pongyis*) in red-orange robes suddenly came to light in the streets of the big Burmese cities. On the 24th September, thousands of monks, chanting the “Metta sutta”, Buddha’s famous words on the theme of love and universal peace, left the pagoda Shwedagon, to take a peaceful march in the heart of Rangoon. The monks, as the Canon gives them their right to it, demanded that the prices of fuel oils and food products imposed on the inhabitants since the 15th August be quashed, apart from the Military’s apology for having treated their colleagues violently in a peaceful demonstration in central Pakokku.

 

 Three days later, thanks to the international media, the people witnessed their Armed Forces shooting at the protesting monks and civilian who had joined them, killing a Japanese photographer in passing. On the 28th September the incredulity gave way to terror: making the most of the night, the soldiers had ransacked and plundered a number of Rangoon monasteries, beating their occupants and taking them to an unknown destination. For the first time Burmese Armed Forces and police had taken out on the monks directly.

 

Burma had already experienced demonstrations in 1988, when the students and the people had revolted against an obscurantist military dictatorship which, led by the General Ne Win since the 2^nd March 1962, pursued a ‘Burmese way towards socialism.’ But this revolt ended in a blood bath (official number of dead was given as 502 but the estimated accounts was 3000). The Burmese technique of restoring order was not lost for everyone as eight months later the Chinese revolt suffered the same fate at Tien An Men. Ideological orphan won over by the prevailing Buddhism, the new junta was duty bound to look for a moral authority that it lacked. The State Sangha Maha Nayaka, created in 1980 and comprising 47 monks subservient to the Military, has played this role. This gerontocratic organization led by old and bedridden monks preached obedience to the Burmese devotees. By their sermons as much as by their silences, they contributed to uphold the grip of dictatorship – that they have saved three times (August 1988, 1990 and 2007). In recognition of their faithful services, the junta awarded them every year with dozens of prestigious ceremonial titles. The most well known, Bhaddanta, is awarded to all the old monks close to the regime (with a monthly allowance that could accrue with other emoluments). The population mockingly nicknamed these prelates Bhaddanta Toyota or Bhaddanta Toshiba. They received their titles from the hands of the generals during endless ceremonies shown on television (called tele-pagodas). Which lets the spectators whisper in referring to the colors of the uniforms and monastic robes: “In our country the television has only two colors, green and orange.” 

 

The nineteen years following the coup d’Etat of 18th September 1988 were marked by the same incompetence of the military personnel entrusted with public affairs, the same economic and financial wastes, an increased corruption and a series of decisions drawn on the catalogue of totalitarianism. Increasing the number of soldiers (brought up to 400,000 men), police and secret services; refusal to acknowledge the ‘free and fair’ election results that the dictatorship had itself organized in May 1990; creation of a National Convention of 1075 members appointed to prevent the meeting of the 588 deputies (492 for the National League for Democracy founded by Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi) elected; creation of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) of which the 23 million members were entrusted with supporting all the activities of the regime, organizing support demonstrations and exposing all the ‘dubious’ elements of their vicinity. These structures were henceforth completed by a back-up paramilitary organization (Swan arr shin = the all powerful). These new bullyboys of the regime were the rebirth of a royal institution, that of ‘ringed cheeks’ (a ring was tattooed on their cheeks). In the past the recruits of this organization were criminals in charge of capital executions, torturing, despoiling or keeping the prisoners of the king. Since two years the reincarnations of these persons do not hesitate to attack the democrats physically.

 

From 1989 the junta created, ‘new cities’ in all the provinces, in the outskirts of the old centres. They have enabled both to slim down the overpopulated areas of the old cities and to divert the opponents’ resources. Many construction sites were associated with these buildings: bridges, railways, roads, canals, and dams. In this context the use of forced labor, another tradition inherited from the royal period, was brought back in vogue by the junta. In the provinces the military leaders asked the village headmen some ‘voluntary’ workers to provide the required manpower, for three days to one month, for the several construction sites to function. In the plains, when the military leaders wanted land, they relocated the villages and brought the inhabitants together wherever they pleased. In the mountains, especially in the Karen State, the non Burmese populations did not always have the luck to be ‘relocated’, especially when they lived close to rich teak forests (coveted by the Sino-Thai hucksters) and in the Salween river basin whose hydroelectric potential was coveted by the Chinese to feed the industries of the Yunnan. Some villages were destroyed by fire and the inhabitants, victims of forced movements, were hunted down in the jungle, to which some 150,000 Karens testify, having found refuge in the camps situated at the Thai border.

 

These exactions are not new. The History of Indo-China shows that the sovereigns, Burmese, Thais or Khmers, did not proceed differently. After the capture of Syriam in the XVIIth century, thousands of Portuguese were deported to the villages of Central Burma where their descendants, Christians with blue eyes, still live. Closer to us Khmers Rouges have done the same when they deported the urbanites to make them work in the countryside. In Burma, the military leaders remain attached to their secular traditions: the junta of 1988 has defeated its enemies and conquered their territory. This ‘victory’ has made the Burmese Military the real owner of the Burmese soil and its inhabitants, which justifies the exploitation of its conquest according to its needs. Consequently the junta can say ‘the State is the Military’, and vice versa. In the whole Union the Armed Forces’monopolizing the lands is a product of this conception.

 

Since 1988, the army can rent or sell plots of lands to anyone but preferably to the military leaders, civilians or monks, who serve well the regime. For nearly two decades, the military government has thus widely favored the monks by selling them lands to construct monasteries and other religious buildings. The junta thought of having acquired recognition of the monks who ensured the moral Order. The recent events having shown that it was not always the case, the Military wants its revenge. To punish those considered as traitors the junta sometimes tries to recuperate the plots sold by its intermediaries. The pretext is easy to find: those who have sold the plots did not have the right to do so. Therefore the monasteries could be expropriated and the dissenter monks could lose their stake. In the end the Military’s supporters are rewarded with the spoils of the vanquished enemies.

 

None of the Council of Grand Masters’ member has participated in the demonstrations organized by the “Alliance of all the Monks of Burma”, a clandestine organization founded by a young monk of 29 years named U Gambiya. First succeeding in escaping the police raids, he was finally arrested on the 4^th November. Accused of treason he incurs death penalty. But the ‘victory’ of the junta is in fact a Pyrrhic victory. The division of the Sangha (The community of monks) between young democrat monks close to the people and the old monks sponsored by the regime (the monks of the government) is henceforth accomplished. The Council of the Grand Masters, which did nothing to help the people, nor the young monks, lost its magisterial moral. For the Buddhist, to kill a monk is the worst of sins. Consequently, the regime cannot anymore pride itself of a Buddhist ideology, for it has knowingly scoffed at all the most important precepts of Buddhism.

 

In the monastic defiles, essentially made up of novices and young monks, the elderly monks were rare. The demographic composition of the revolted perfectly reflect that of a society where 70 % of the population, which at less than 35 years, holds no sway over a power monopolized by aged leaders. General Than Shwe, Chairman of the junta, at 74 years and his close collaborators are hardly younger. History shows that young people founded the Union of Burma (Aung San was 32 years old when he negotiated the independence with the British). Nowadays it would be unthinkable to confide the least political responsibility to a young person, even a military leader. Conversely, Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi (62 years), still under house arrest, has united the Burmese youth to her cause. Before long the country will face with a problem of succession to this discredited regime.

 

Confronted with this rejection, ‘the Generals will not be able to survive’ very long, reckoned Lee Kwan Yew on the 10^th October last. ‘These Generals are rather dumb. How can they manage the economy so badly and reach this situation when the country has so much natural resources?’ The military elites’ families are perfectly conscious of the degradation of the regime. Enriched by corruption they have already placed their spoils in the foreign banks. A long list of account holders is already circulating in the Web. These families have the means to travel, have themselves cured in the best foreign hospitals, and send their children to study anywhere in the world. The son of a wealthy huckster recently hit the headlines of a Singapore gazette following contemptuous statements he had made about his country. We can imagine that the Generals educate their children abroad to prepare their inheritance. But what will be the status of the country they leave?

 

In the meantime, criticisms and demands for liberalization leave the junta particularly all the more indifferent given the fact that it gets the unfailing support of the Chinese government, leading business partner, and leading arms supplier of Burma. China wants to get all the natural resources that it needs, open up Yunnan, and access the shores of the Gulf of Bengal to guarantee regular provisions in hydrocarbons. Getting ahead of India, Petrochina has already signed contracts to construct gas and oil pipelines that will transport the petroleum products from Arakan to Yunnan China. In these conditions China will do everything to maintain the stability of the Union. Its influence is fundamental to explain all the changes of the junta.

 

The international pressure for a boycott of the 2008 Olympic Games pushed Beijing to encourage Naypyidaw to make some gestures supposed to accelerate the process of democratization. To forestall criticisms from the international community the Chinese have pushed the junta to welcome Mr. Gambari, the special envoys from United Nations, to allow him to meet Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, and appoint a ‘Liaison Minister’ as a binding process for negotiation. This visit was followed by Mr. Pinheiro’s visit, who was sent by the Commission of United Nations for Human Rights. He was able to meet some political opponents in the Insein prison. But the General-President was not able to receive the two special envoys. On the other hand, the Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Wang Yi, who was at the same time in Burma, was able to meet the Senior-General and all the members of the junta. Concerning Human Rights, no serious progress was made up to date. Mrs. Suu Kyi remains under house arrest. It appears that the junta, who does not want to negotiate, and the Chinese, who think of their J.Os, manipulate the international community to gain time. The Chinesehave no interest to precipitatethe fall of such an accommodating partner to facilitate access to power of a democratic regime that would be uneasy to control.

 

As for the future of Burma, two scenarios are conceivable. In the first case we can fear that the hard-liner Generals do not retreat from the prospect of a civil war among the Burmese themselves on one hand and, on the other, between the Burmese and the minorities. Such a conflict could lead to a break-up of the Union. One wonders in this context whether the Generals are in the process of preparing the ground by exacerbating tensions in the civil society. In the second scenario we can imagine that some military leaders, conscious of the threats weighing on their country, open up to the external world, taking power and opening the door for real negotiations with the democrats of Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi. Ideally the conflict between the Military and democrats could thus end in a political power-sharing and national reconciliation. Nevertheless more than one generation will be required to remove this country, blessed by Gods and cursed for men, from the abyssal zone of obscurantism where it has been precipitated by an almost half-century old dictatorship.

 

 

 

* Pongyi is the Burmese word to refer to a monk of the Theravada School. It must not be mixed up with Bonze who is a monk belonging to the Japanese Buddhist sect Zen, affiliated to the Mahayana School (Big Vehicle). The pongyi inevitablyobserves celibacy while the bonze is generally married.