In January 2011, an 8m high statue of Confucius was erected in front of the National Museum of China located on Tian’anmen Square. The Sage now stands side by side with Mao on one of the most symbolical location of China’s recent history.
Statue of Confucius in front of the National Museum of China
(© 2011 / Sébastien Billioud and Imre Toth)
Mentioning a revival of Confucianism in today’s China might seem highly paradoxical considering that Confucianism left the front stage of history during the 20th century. With the end of the empire, it lost its central political and social role as well as its holistic dimension. Its remnants took the forms of a few scattered projects, be they ideological, religious or intellectual ones. After 1949, its fate seemed to be sealed. During the Maoist era, fierce political campaigns took place against the “four Olds” (old customs, culture, habits, ideas) and, during the Cultural Revolution, against Confucius (the “criticize Lin Biao, criticize Confucius” campaign). The era of reform and opening generated later on what was sometimes described as “the individualization of Chinese society”, that is, an affirmation of the individual in the most various realms (professional and economic activity, family relations, gender relations, cultural references and so forth). Such a context could hardly be considered a favourable ground for the revival of Confucianism and its “feudal values”…
However, references to Confucianism made a strong comeback during the first decade of the new century. Such a phenomenon, largely driven by reinventions, dreams, utopias, or, occasionally, nationalistic feelings – even though it is in no way possible to reduce it to this single dimension – took, and still take, a variety of different forms.
In the field of education, classical Confucian texts are re-appropriated by extremely different segments of the population. Particularly striking is the “children’s classics reading movement,” a phenomenon that largely takes place outside of the compulsory school system. Learning methods (i.e. repeated readings of difficult classical texts by young children in order to make the most of their memorization abilities) often consider “Western education” – and the primacy it ascribes to the understanding of things learned – a model to be avoided. We are not alluding here to a marginal movement. Even though no reliable figures exist millions of children would be involved. In its most radical forms, this movement translates into the opening of traditional schools (private schools promoting a curriculum largely based on classical texts), a phenomenon that, though marginal, nevertheless gains momentum and paves the way for an array of different pedagogical experimentations.
The revived interest in classical texts sometimes has utilitarian objectives (such as the acquisition of a “cultural capital”, boosting children’s level at school, economic benefits stemming from the development of Confucianism-based business activities etc). However, it also very often has a “spiritual dimension” of self-cultivation that echoes a number of currently reactivated Confucian rituals: ceremonies to honour Confucius in temples, reinventions of the main rites of passage (capping, wedding, funerals). We are close here to a religious dimension of Confucianism that may be openly claimed or not. Sometimes, it is the case and Confucian activists attempt to open new places of cults even though Confucianism is not currently considered one of the five officially recognized religions in the PRC. Besides, Confucianism-inspired intellectuals propose a number of solutions to re-institutionalize Confucianism as a religion, be it as one religion among others, as a State religion or as a civil religion.
Confucian activists honouring Mencius in Zoucheng, Shandong province
(© 2011 / Sébastien Billioud)
Examples of this reactivation of Confucianism could be easily multiplied: creation of NGOs, promotion of classical texts in companies, reopening of traditional structures such as lineages’ ancestral halls and so forth. However, these burgeoning activities remain mostly scattered and, so far, ill-structured.
Several factors may contribute to explain this Confucian revival.
First, we may turn to historical explanations. On the one hand, the current Confucian revival does not start from scratch. During the 20th century, a number of projects – be they intellectual, educational, ideological or religious – perpetuated fragments of the Confucian heritage. The role of places such as Taiwan and Hong Kong needs here to be emphasized. Rereading such a fragmented heritage is necessary to understand the current situation. On the other hand, the revival of Confucianism is a trend that also needs to be understood within the broader framework of China’s relation to its past, and, by extension, to time. A striking phenomenon in China today is a “production (or re-appropriation) of past” that relates, if we refer to Koselleck’s well-known notions, to a double broadening of the population’s “space of experience” and “horizon of expectation.” Such a “production of past” is partial, largely reinvented, diverse and translates into a variety of “fevers”, be they for Ming studies, guoxue (national studies), or even Maoism. In that context, the revival of a reference to Confucianism is not really surprising considering its pivotal importance in Chinese history.
Second, we may also invoke sociological explanations. Within the overall (and prevailing) context of “individualization of Chinese society” and dissolution of all kinds of structures of social cohesion (from the work unit to the family) it is also possible to observe an opposite trend characterized by a production of collective identity and that can be exemplified by the quick development of all religions. Not only is Confucianism able to tap a share of this buoyant religious market but it can also successfully position itself on the broader “market of values” in a post-Maoist and partially secularized society.
What role do the authorities play in this “Confucian revival”? One frequent commentary is to associate Confucianism in China today with an ideological project. Often mentioned are a few official slogans that vaguely sound Confucian (e.g, “harmonious society”), the necessity of an ideology of substitution, the debate that took place in the 1980s about Asian values, a few cultural artefacts (such as Zhang Yimou’s movie Confucius) or the famous Chinese soft-power and the network of Confucius institutes. In reality, the role of the authorities should neither be negated nor exaggerated.
Even though Chinese authorities now largely refer to traditional culture in the context of their cultural policy or symbolically associate traditional culture with the image of China that they want to promote, there is no evidence of any important or precise function that they would intend to ascribe to Confucianism. Apart from their episodic support of a few specific activities – for example when the Ministry of culture supports a local project to celebrate one of the tutelary figures of Chinese civilization – the main contribution of the central authorities to the current “Confucian fever” mainly lies, so far, in its relative toleration vis-à-vis grassroots initiatives.
At a local level, Confucian activists necessarily need to find a framework for their activities and are therefore obliged to permanently discuss and negotiate their projects with the authorities. In the absence of any clear policy at the central level and because of the extreme diversity of activities carried out by Confucian activists, the attitude of local authorities fluctuates enormously depending on places and people involved and ranges from direct support to mere tolerance or straight interdiction. Support may depend on a variety of considerations: economic and touristic, social (e.g. role of the revival of linage halls for elderly citizens), educational (e.g. promotion of classical texts in schools), cultural, ideological/moral (e.g. promotion of filial piety in the framework of patriotic education campaigns) and so forth. It is possible to emphasize the importance of the personal commitments of Confucian activists employed as cadres within the state apparatus. This situation is a frequent one and probably contributes a lot to the current development of Confucianism. Moreover, it provides a clear illustration of the fact that it is difficult to explain the “Confucian revival” based on explanatory models that frontally oppose state and society.
Sébastien Billioud is Associate Professor in Chinese civilization, University Paris Diderot.
News main page
30/12/14
from 01/04/12 to 31/03/13
