Eastern Asia has not been spared from the shock wave that followed the disappearance of the bipolar world and the cold war. Almost 'mechanically', the traditional allies of the ex-Soviet Union in the Far East, Vietnam and Laos in particular, but also the diverse armed insurrections that it supported and, to a lesser extent, it is true, China and North Korea were losing a strong backing.
At the same time, ASEAN, mainly created to contain the communist upsurge of South East Asia, had to, following the example of NATO in Europe, rethink its mission, and reinvent for itself a raison d’etre, while Japan, South Korea and Taiwan entered into a phase of restating their strategic partnership with the United States.
While the political and economical stakes themselves became more and more global, the process of regionalisation of the security questions slowly but surely went on within the regional multilateral fora (ASEAN, ASEAN + 3**) or bi/multi-regional (APEC, ASEM, ARF*** ). It is however too early still to evaluate in terms of security the real impact of the recent East Asia Summit that was held in December 2005 at Kuala Lumpur.
The fact remains that these multilateral consultations and accords that traditionally deal with questions of conventional security, from now on attack the stakes of « non-conventional» security more and more: terrorism, illegal migrant movements and human trafficking, money laundering, drug trafficking and other prohibited products, sea piracy, health security …
On all these subjects, overcoming their traditional reserve for the intergovernmental mechanisms of public security affecting the key sectors with their national sovereignty, the Eastern Asian governments begin a cooperation that sometimes works « in pain», sometimes after traumatizing exogenous shocks (terrorism, tsunami, SRAS and bird flu epidemic, acts of sea piracy…). Then some limited agreements fall into place among the seemingly most concerned countries, for various reasons and meant for dealing with each problem individually. Some ad-hoc tools that one can qualify as « strengthened cooperations », to use the European jargon.
But the European analogy must end there. Lot more than in Europe, the Eastern Asia stability depends on the American power and influence. In spite of the beginnings of regional or sub-regional cooperation cited above, no system of efficient public security has really emerged in the region, where the European Union continues to play the dominant role. More than in Europe, it is the positive or negative relation with Washington that more often than not determines the strategic analysis of each one of the governments. North East Asia is no doubt the region in the world in which the legacy of the Second World War and cold war is the most perceptible, by means of a series of sources of tension and potential conflicts: Korean peninsula, strait of Taiwan, tensions between Chinese, Koreans and Japanese aggravating the territorial and coastal demands… On all these burning issues, the United States remains the central player. In Southeast Asia, the situation is more contrasted with restlessness – South Thailand, Centre Sulawesi, Mindanao, and terrorism …-, but also appeasements –Aceh, where the European Union plays a conspicuous role, Moluccas-.
The economic and political emergence of China changes the deal in many ways: it displaces the centre of economic gravity of the region, upsetting the trade flows and Direct Foreign Investments (IDE) ; it is the carrier of increasing rivalries as much for the trade outlets as for the energy and raw material supplies and their delivery, by « South roads » (straits of Malacca, Indian Ocean) and « North roads » (Central Asia, Siberia) ; the Chinese upsurge is of course a source of military tension from the United States, whose only perspective of not seeing its 7th Fleet master the game 100% any more produces astonishment and shivers in Pentagon.
It is therefore in this tense context that the Asian regional organizations develop today. The rise in power of China, the more assertive position of Japan in military issues, some doubts on the American commitment in Asia, the reawakening of India especially towards the East, all contribute to make of this first decade of the 21st century a turning point in the balance of forces in Asia. The regional or sub-regional organizations naturally reflect this evolution.
Europe would be well inspired to follow all this very closely and adopt an open and reactive posture, if it does not want to miss this train and count for a negligeable quantity in this big reorganization, with all that it entails.
*Bertrand Fort is the Deputy Executive Director of the Asia Europe Foundation(ASEF), started in 1997 and based at Singapore and from 1998 to 2002, held among other functions, the post of Advisor to Hubert Vedrine, French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
**APEC : Asia Pacific Economic Forum ; ASEM : Asia Europe Meeting ; ARF : ASEAN Regional Forum, i.e. the members of ASEAN + 3 and, as observers, the United States, Russia, European Union.
***Bringing together the members of the Association of the Nations of South East Asia and China, Japan and South Korea. |